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concessional resources through a procedure
which is mainly based on the quality of the
beneficiary countries’ economic policy and
governance. This allocation procedure relies
mainly on the Performance-Based Allocation
formula which can be criticized on two grounds.
Firstly, the weight on economic policy and
governance is viewed as being excessive.
Secondly, it lacks transparency and consisten-
cy. We consider how to amend that formula so
as to take into account certain common charac-
teristics of many African countries. The main
proposal is to augment the formula by an eco-
nomic vulnerability criterion. The numerical
simulations show that the introduction of the
United Nations economic vulnerability index in
the formula gives rise to allocations which not
only account for post conflict situations but
also inherent fragility. We also consider a lower
population weight in order to address the pro-
blem of country size. This change helps avoid
inconsistencies arising from the application of
country allocation ceilings in the various stages
of the computation. Finally, a few proposals
concerning the African Development Fund’s
support to regional integration are explored.
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The African Development Bank Group
(AfDB) allocates its development aid
among its beneficiary countries through
its soft loan window, the African
Development Fund (ADF), using a proce-
dure which focuses mainly on the quality
of their economic policy and governance.
Forty of the fifty-three AfDB Regional
Member countries (RMCs) are eligible for
ADF financing. These include two so-cal-
led blend countries (Nigeria and
Zimbabwe), which also have access to
the non-concessional window. This AfDB
procedure is similar to that of other multi-
lateral development banks. The prece-
dence given to the governance criterion
has been criticized in academic circles as
well as the donor community. The main
critique addressed to the current aid allo-
cation formula is that it does not suffi-
ciently take into account the characteris-
tics of low-income countries, especially
low-income African countries. 
It should, however be noted that the for-
mula used to allocate ADF-11 resources
to eligible countries has improved compa-
red to the one used under ADF-10. The
new formula is clearer and has eliminated
the problem of double counting of the
governance factor. In addition, the esta-
blishment of the Fragile States Facility,
compared to a post-conflict factor in the
old formula, better recognizes the vulne-
rability of the recipients (ADF 2008a). The
increase in the allocation for regional ope-
rations is welcomed since most African
countries are small and have very high
communication costs. 
Nonetheless, new adjustments can be
considered with a view to taking into
account the characteristics of AfDB
regional member countries and enhan-
cing its aid effectiveness (ADF 2008b).
With this in mind, this paper considers
the advisability of adapting the ADF allo-
cation formula and the possible effects
on the geographical distribution of ADF
resources. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into
three parts. Section 2 focuses on deve-
lopment aid allocation principles and pro-
blems raised by the current allocation pro-
cess, such as the weight given to perfor-
mance and the treatment of small coun-
tries and fragile countries. Section 3 out-
lines adjustments to the allocation formu-
la; take into account certain key features
of African countries such as their econo-
mic vulnerability, their limited human capi-
tal, and their disparate size. Section 4
proposes some innovations for the treat-
ment of regional cooperation within the
context of aid allocation. An annex pre-
sents the formula for the performance-
based allocation formula, proposed
1amendments and results of numerical
simulations, as well as some alternative
measures of governance. 
2.  Aid Allocation Principles
and Issues
We argue that a development aid formula
should be based on three principles,
which are presented in Section 2.1.
Section 2.2 presents the steps of the cur-
rent performance-based allocation (PBA)
process. We then continue with a discus-
sion of the weight given to the quality of
economic policy and governance (Section
2.3) in the allocation process and conclu-
de with an analysis of the challenges
posed by fragile states and small coun-
tries.
2.1  Principles
The first principle concerns aid effective-
ness in promoting growth and, beyond
that, contributing to the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). Here it is
appropriate to consider the features of
beneficiary countries that determine the
effectiveness of aid they receive (World
Bank 1998). It is within this purview that
donors, influenced by the World Bank,
have made good governance a core crite-
rion of their allocation formula. There are,
however other factors which determine
aid effectiveness. For example, a coun-
try’s economic vulnerability is one such
factor (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001,
Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004, 2009,
Guillaumont 2006, 2007, Guillaumont and
Laajal 2006). In terms of effectiveness,
economic vulnerability, particularly to
external shocks, can be seen as an allo-
cation criterion that is just as pertinent as
the quality of economic policy and gover-
nance.
The second principle that an allocation
formula should be based on is equity. A
modern idea of justice, developed in parti-
cular by Rawls (1971) and Roemer
(1998), is to give equal opportunities to all
individuals, so that inequalities only result
from differences in effort and performan-
ce. Sen (1999) develops this theory by
stating that accessibility to opportunities is
one of the main determinants of develop-
ment. Thinking in terms of nations and not
of individuals, equity thus means allowing
countries equal chances of escaping
poverty, and compensating for the structu-
ral handicaps which limit the effectiveness
of their effort. These structural handicaps
are durable features of the countries that
are beyond their present political will,
reflecting historical and geographical fac-
tors and the international environment.
Therefore policy must consider how these
can be expanded.  Here again, economic
vulnerability is a valid equity criterion for
aid allocation, as is limited human capital
2(Guillaumont 2006, 2009a). These two
factors reduce in a sustainable manner,
the chances of a long term economic
take-off.
The third principle is transparency. It is
important for donors to be able to appre-
ciate the relative weight of the allocation
criteria, as these reflect international com-
munity policy. Moreover, each government
that receives aid should be able to calcu-
late its allocation using the formula (IDA
2007a). This means that the formula
should remain simple, with easily acces-
sible and internationally recognized indi-
cators, and integrate the various alloca-
tion criteria in a consistent manner.
2.2  Steps in the Allocation Process
The allocation of ADF resources in accor-
dance with a performance-based formula
involves several stages (ADF 2008a). The
first consists in calculating each country’s
share of resources using a performance-
based formula. The share depends mainly
on the country’s population, the evalua-
tion of the country’s performance, and on
the level of its per capita income.
Performance evaluation is based on the
Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment Index (CPIA) which is com-
puted once a year by AfDB country eco-
nomists. The CPIA is made up of a num-
ber of indicators reflecting the quality of
macroeconomic management, structural
policies, social policies and lastly, public
sector and institutional management. The
weight of the latter element is more than
double that of the first three. Also taken
into account to a marginal extent is the
quality of the AfDB’s project portfolio in
each country. This performance-based
allocation formula is in Annex A.
The second phase of the process involves
dividing a country’s allocation between
loans and grants. Country eligibility to
these forms of finance are dependent,
much in the same way as at the World
Bank, on its level of long term debt.
Where there is a high risk of unsustai-
nable debt, the country only receives
grants rather than loans or a combination
of the two. The classification used by the
AfDB is the same as that used by the
Bretton Woods Institutions. It is based on
the definition of debt thresholds which in
turn depend upon the quality of policy as
measured by the CPIA. Net Present Value
(NPV) of public/national debt as a percen-
tage of GDP is used as one indicator and
servicing of debt (as a percentage of
exports or fiscal receipts) as the other.
When the CPIA is less than 3.25, the limit
for NPV debt as a share of GDP is 30
percent, whereas if the CPIA falls bet-
ween 3.25 and 3.75, the limit is 40 per-
cent. If the CPIA equals or is greater than
3.75, the limit increases to 50 percent
(see Tables 1 and 2).
3Grants are reduced by 20 percent. This
percentage can be broken down into two
elements. First, 10.12 percent corres-
ponds to the additional cost to ADF of
substituting a grant for a loan. Second,
9.88 percent is levied to incite the recei-
ving countries to improve their policies
and reduce their debt. 
The third step concerns AfDB debt forgive-
ness under the multilateral debt relief
Initiative (MDRI). Countries that undergo
debt cancellations are only eligible to
grants minus the level of their debt cancel-
lation. These amounts are however reallo-
cated to all ADF eligible countries using
the performance based formula (African
Development Bank 2007).
Alongside performance-based allocations,
20 percent of ADF-11 resources have
been earmarked to finance fragile states
and regional operations. The additional
financing granted under the new Fragile
States Facility (FSF), reserved for a few
countries, supports countries via a three-
pillar framework: 
i.   Supplementary funding for post-
conflict and transitory countries,
ii.  Arrears clearance;
4
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25iii. Targeted support to increase institutio-
nal and administrative capacity. 
Pillar 1 is fundamental in the FSF. The
PBA is multiplied by a factor which
depends on available resources(2).  Nine
countries were identified for additional
allocations in 2008: Burundi, the Central
African Republic, Comoros, the Democra-
tic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau,
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo (African
Development Fund 2008b). C￴te d’Ivoire
benefited from the second pillar in 2009.
The third pillar is designed for technical
assistance to countries where the situa-
tion is more difficult and is generally limi-
ted to UA 2 million per country. In addi-
tion, a regional allocation primarily
finances trans-border infrastructure and
regional public goods as necessary. The
novel feature in ADF-11 was that one-third
of the cost of regional operations was
financed with the allocations of respective
countries.
2.3  Economic Policy and Governance
The ADF resource allocation process
gives a very large weight to the quality of
economic policy and governance, mainly
though the performance-based allocation
(PBA) formula. For example if a country’s
performance rating (CPA) increases from
3 to 3.5, its allocation, as calculated in the
first step, increases by 67 percent ceteris
paribus. The impact on the final allocation
will be similar, although not identical since
the two subsequent stages of computation
also marginally reflect the country’s per-
formance.
In addition, the performance assessment
gives governance (measured by category
D of the CPIA) more than twice the weight
of economic policy (measured by catego-
ries A, B and C of the CPIA). The CPIA
score is also taken into account in subse-
quent steps of the allocation process.
There is a 20-percent reduction in aid in
grant form, but the decision to give aid in
grant form alone is determined by the
level of sustainable debt which is, itself,
an increasing function of the CPIA.
Furthermore, the reallocation of funds
deriving from part of the grant discount
and the Multilateral Debt Reduction
Initiative (MDRI) is carried out in accor-
dance with the performance-based formu-
la (African Development Bank 2008a).
2.3.1  Uncertainty in Performance
Measurement 
The importance given to performance
raises several issues (IDA 2007a).
Performance measurement is based on
subjective methods. To illustrate this, let
5
(2)The top-up multiplier in 2008 was 1.97. The UA 5 million minimum allocation is excluded from the base for
applying the multiplier.us consider three alternative economic
policy indicators: Kaufmann-Kraay-
Mastruzzi (KKM) (Kaufmann et al. 2003),
the World Bank Cost of Doing Business
(World Bank 2008), and the Mo Ibrahim
Foundation indicator (Annex B). None of
these indicators is very strongly correlated
with the CPIA (between 0.8 and 0.5)(3).
Moreover, the distribution of funds among
countries would be very different if KKM
or Doing Business were to replace CPIA
in the PBA(4). This result clearly raises the
question as to how the indicator is
constructed, with an emphasis on the
analysis of formal regulations, in countries
that do not share the same legal culture,
as has indeed been noted by the World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group.
2.3.2  Instability of the evaluation
of good policy
The uncertainty concerning the good poli-
cy indicator explains its instability. The
context is that of a general increase in
CPIA from 1999 to 2007 (averaging 18
percent for ADF countries). However the
situations vary greatly. The index has
deteriorated for ten out of forty countries.
The impact of the CPIA instability on allo-
cations depends on how each country’s
CPIA varies in relation to the average of
the rest. A first measurement of CPIA
instability is the variation coefficient of
each country’s annual CPIA ratio to the
CPIA average over the 1999-2007. For all
ADF-eligible countries, this variation coef-
ficient averages 10 percent, and exceeds
that level for 11 countries(5).  CPIA insta-
bility is further evidenced in the succes-
sion of reverse variations: six countries
have recorded four improvements and
four decreases in eight years and most of
the countries have had at least three
improvements and three declines CPIA
instability, together with the instability of
the other elements of the allocation for-
mula and the variation of available funds,
is one of the factors that have significantly
contributed to the instability of allocations. 
2.3.3  Weak analytical basis
Another reason to reduce the CPIA’s
weight in aid allocation is the weak analy-
tical basis. Including the CPIA in the aid
6
(3) The high correlation between the AfDB and the World Bank CPIAs (0.97) should not be interpreted as an indi-
cation  of  the  objectivity  because  of  formal  and  informal  consultations  between  the  two  institutions.
(4) In the first case, the variation in the final allocation depending on which indicator is used, exceeds 20 percent
(in absolute value) in over half the cases. In the second case, the allocations are even more significantly diffe-
rent: English-speaking countries, with the exception of Liberia and Sierra Leone, stand to gain while all the
French-speaking countries are heavy losers. The tables showing all the computations mentioned are available
upon request from the authors.
(5) Angola, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, C￴te d’Ivoire, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo and Zimbabwe.allocation process is based on the
assumption that aid is only effective in
well-governed countries. This theory was
proposed by Burnside and Dollar (2000,
1997) and endorsed by the World Bank
(World Bank 1998). The supposed link
between the quality of policy and the
effectiveness of aid in terms of growth
forms the basis of the model for optimal
allocation of world aid presented by
Collier and Dollar (2002, 2001). However,
this theory has been fiercely criticized
from both the analytical and econometric
standpoints. It premises that aid effective-
ness is measured solely in terms of grow-
th and that aid cannot improve policy. This
last assumption is highly debatable
(Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2001).
Moreover, the econometric results do not
appear to be robust (Hansen and Tarp
2001, Dalgaard and Hansen 2001,
Lensink and White 2001, Easterly 2003
and Roodman, 2007). Some studies have
shown small positive significant effects on
growth from aid where there have been
good fiscal, monetary and trade policies
(Charavati 2005). However these effects
varied and depended on the characteris-
tics of the country and region.
The weak link between policy quality and
aid effectiveness has altered donor moti-
vation. The performance criterion applied
for allocation has become a reward for
virtuous governments, especially those
fighting corruption, and an incentive for
others to adopt good practices. However,
allocating aid in line with sound economic
policy runs into the same criticism as the
conditionality generally attached to budget
support (Collier et al. 1997). Dictating to
governments which policy should be follo-
wed prevents them from taking ownership
of the policy and so limits effectiveness. A
further problem with such an approach is
that it implicitly assumes homogeneity in
countries and so applies the same poli-
cies. 
2.4  Fragile States and Small Countries
2.4.1  Treatment of Fragile States
The strict application of the PBA formula,
which attaches little importance to the
needs of countries (through the per capita
income for which the exponent is -0,125),
quickly became untenable. Many coun-
tries, particularly those emerging from war
or internal conflicts are facing serious poli-
tical problems that translate into a low
CPIA and at the same time highly need
assistance. Moreover, aid to these coun-
tries logically may be particularly effective
since they have experienced a substantial
contraction of their income, and have a
potential for short- term expansion, and
also because aid could help prevent the
resurgence of conflicts (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004, African Development Fund
2008c, Guillaumont 2007b). This is the
justification for the Fragile States Facility
7which has replaced the multiplier applied
for allocations to post-conflict countries,
so as to assist distressed countries and
aid orphans.
However this practice has a paradoxical
result: ADF per capita aid decreases in
line with performance and then suddenly
increases, reaching a particularly high
level around the CPA mid-point. As a
result, the relationship between alloca-
tions and the performance evaluation is
not monotone increasing, as clearly illus-
trated by Annex D on 2008 allocations,
which presents the countries by quintile
according to their CPA.
Even if the Fragile States Facility was
established to take into account the fact
that the performance weighting penalizes
countries which need aid the most, the
volume of aid thus awarded depends on
the amount of ADF-10 allocations, which
is largely performance-based. Also, bene-
ficiaries of the facility are required to have
demonstrated their desire to improve their
policy and aid may be suspended if that
desire is not evident. 
2.4.2  Thresholds and ceilings
2.4.4  Another problem is how to deal with
small countries. Small sizes are recogni-
zed as a handicap, especially for landloc-
ked countries. They offer limited econo-
mies of scale in the civil service, produc-
tion is necessarily concentrated in a few
sectors, and the domestic market is nar-
row (IDA 2007b). To avoid having the
available funds overly focused on a few
large countries, a minimum country allo-
cation has been introduced (base alloca-
tion of UA 5 million) as well as a maxi-
mum (10 percent of total resources for
each country and 5 percent for the entire
blend group). This is a source of disconti-
nuity in allocations leading to anomalies.
For example, Ethiopia, which at the end
of the first stage, prior to the application of
the ceiling, was to received 45 percent
more than Tanzania, finally received 3.4
percent less.
The transparency requirement set out in
Section 2.1 calls into question the practice
of floors and ceilings which are intended
to take a country’s small size into account
as a handicap, but in doing so, it compli-
cates the application of the formula. This
discontinuity of treatment is aggravated in
the allocation of supplementary funds to
fragile states with a floor of UA 10 million
and a ceiling of UA 60 million.
3.  Proposed Adjustments
of the Allocation Formula
We present two adjustments to the alloca-
tion formula ensuing from the previous
discussion. Firstly, we propose to take
into account the structural handicaps
encountered by certain countries in their
8efforts to exit poverty. The United Nations
uses these handicaps – economic vulne-
rability and the low level of human assets
– to identify the group of least developed
countries (LDCs) to which developed
countries have pledged a volume of aid
equivalent to 0.15 percent of their GDP.
Including these criteria in the formula
would reduce the instability of allocations,
since structural handicaps are by defini-
tion relatively stable. Most importantly, this
would make it possible to treat the pro-
blem of fragility of certain countries in an
integrated framework. We chose not to
propose a definition of performance that
would include outcomes instead of the
implementation of policies. In this case,
progress in education and health could be
potential indicators (Kanbur, 2005).
However, outcome indicators change very
slowly and are not only a result of the
choice of policies, but also of external fac-
tors (Adam et al. 2004).
3.1  Economic Vulnerability
3.1.1  Justification 
Introducing economic vulnerability is justi-
fied both from an effectiveness and equity
points of view. Contrary to the Burnside
and Dollar theory, it has been shown that
aid effectiveness in terms of growth does
not only, and perhaps not mainly, depends
on economic policy (Guillaumont 2007a).
There are other factors at work that can
be grouped under the heading of econo-
mic vulnerability. These factors include,
for example, shocks to which certain
developing countries are particularly
exposed, either through international
trade – owing to the variations in world
commodity prices – or as a result of cli-
matic hazards or natural disasters. Such
events, while adversely affecting growth,
raise aid effectiveness (Guillaumont and
Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont
2004). In other words, aid is marginally
more effective in countries that are more
vulnerable or dampens the negative
impact of vulnerability(6). 
In countries exposed to shocks, aid can
prevent a standstill in imports and growth
as well as the downward spiral that often
ensues. The higher the volume of aid is,
the greater the relative extent to which it
dampens the macroeconomic impact of
shocks will be. Economic vulnerability is a
factor of aid effectiveness, mainly due to
the latter’s stabilizing effect. An increase
in aid when a country suffers from a
negative terms of trade shock is evidently
favorable (Collier and Dehn 2001).
Though aid is not systematically counter-
cyclical, it remains a stabilizer, provided it
9
(6) Studies testing this hypothesis have shown more robust results than those again the conventional theory of
aid effectiveness within a good governance economy (Roodman 2007). is less variable than exports, as it is the
case in countries suffering major exoge-
nous shocks (Guillaumont 2006, Chauvet
and Guillaumont 2009). This is in fact a
reason for reducing the instability of allo-
cations. It is often considered that aid has
a negative effect on growth because of
limited absorptive capacity (Easterly
2003). Studies show that success rates of
projects financed by the World Bank
decrease as the total level of world aid
increases. However, in vulnerable coun-
tries this decline has been reduced
(Guillaumont and Laajal 2006). 
Taking economic vulnerability into account
in the allocation formula is not only justi-
fied because it reinforces aid effective-
ness; it is also consistent with a principle
of justice. As stated in section 2.1, aid
equity could mean compensating for
countries’ structural handicaps in order to
give them equal opportunities for develop-
ment. Structural economic vulnerability is
pertinent, to the extent that it is the result
of geography, history or the international
environment. It is a factor that renders
economic policy or national efforts more
difficult. 
3.1.2  Measuring economic vulnerability: 
the United Nations Index
It is suggested that the Bank, rather than
designing its own vulnerability index, uses
the index defined by the United Nations
Development Policy Committee and regu-
larly calculated to identify Least
Developed Countries (United Nations
2008, Guillaumont 2009a, 2009b). For
cost-effectiveness and acceptance in the
broad aid community, it seems advisable
to use an indicator which is internationally
accepted. The Economic Vulnerability
Index (EVI) is a weighted arithmetic ave-
raging of a series of indicators. These
indicators are given below with the related
weights in brackets.
Size of shocks (0.5):
External: instability of goods and
service exports (0.25)
Natural (0.25) : 
instability of agricultural produc-
tion (0.125)
percentage of population displa-
ced as a result of natural disas-
ters (0.125)
Degree of exposure to shocks (0.5)
Small population (0.25)
Remoteness from markets adjus-
ted for landlocked situation (0.125)
Share of agriculture, forestry and
fisheries in overall value added
(0.0625)
concentration of goods exports 
(0.0625)
10Even if the composition of the EVI is rela-
tively sophisticated, its significance is
clear. 
Introducing the EVI into the allocation for-
mula takes small countries into account
marginally, since size is directly included
in the definition of vulnerability and
increases the export concentration. As
economic instability resulting from exter-
nal shocks is often the source of social
unrest, crises and civil war, introducing a
vulnerability indicator implies preventive
and not just curative treatment of fragile
states. The application of economic vulne-
rability as an allocation criterion is consis-
tent with facilities that aim at ex-post
cushioning of shocks, such as FLEX and
the European Development Fund
Envelope B.
3.1.3  Simulations of allocations with EVI 
To illustrate the impact of the vulnerability
indicator on allocations, we expand the
ADF-11 PBA formula by adding EVI to the
performance indicator giving it first a low
weight (one-third of that of performance),
and then an equal weight. These weights
are meant to be indicative. For ease of
comparison, the outcome of simulations
are presented at the same time as the
current allocations, with and without the
fragile states allocations (columns 1 and
2; fragile states are indicated by an aste-
rix in Annex C). 
Comparing simulation 2 which gives the
same weight to performance (CPA) and
vulnerability (EVI), fragile states would,
generally, all receive an allocation similar
to their current one. Only the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) would receive
more, given the ceiling of UA 60 million
which is currently applicable to the Fragile
States supplement and the Comoros
would receive less owing to the floor UA
10 million(7) Guinea Bissau, which also
benefits from the floor but to a lesser
extent, would have almost the same allo-
cation as now. One exception however is
C￴te d’Ivoire which would receive less
than now: it benefits from the fact that the
top-up is a multiple of the ADF-10 alloca-
tion and that she benefits from pillar 2 of
the Fragile States Facility for arrears clea-
rance. If the weight of the EVI is reduced
to a third of that of performance (simula-
tion 1), it is not possible to provide Fragile
States with the current level of allocations.
Introducing the EVI does not only favor
countries that are currently eligible for the
new Fragile States Facility. More general-
ly, it favors countries that suffer from
shocks and are, or risk, experiencing
social or political unrest (simulation 2,
11
(7)  If there was no floor, Comoros would have received a top-up of near UA 1 million column 4)(8). This aid increase will
obviously be to the detriment of countries
which are currently favored owing to their
good CPIA ratings: Kenya (provisionally),
Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal, Cameroon,
and to a lesser extent, Mali. The loss
entailed for these countries is obviously
reduced if the EVI weight is reduced
(Simulation 1).
In short, this new formula would enhance
the stabilizing effect of aid by preventing
excessive reductions in ADF aid to coun-
tries that run into difficulty owing to exter-
nal shocks with the attendant deteriora-
tion of their policy rating. It seeks to provi-
de preventive (and not just curative)
assistance to potentially fragile states. 
3.2  Human Capital
3.2.1  Justification 
A low level of human capital can lessen
the impact of a given volume of aid on
economic growth, at least in the short
term, since it entails weak administrative
capacity. This feature should thus be seen
as an allocation criterion more in the inter-
est of equity than for immediate effective-
ness. However, by making it possible to
strengthen the human capital, aid can, in
the long term, contribute to freeing coun-
tries from the poverty trap, since the lack
of skilled workers causes low productivity
(Sachs et al 2004). Though the per capita
income level is already included in the for-
mula – it shows the distance to be cove-
red to attain levels attained by developed
countries – it does not reliably reflect the
poverty level. That is, of course, why the
Millennium Development Goals refer
directly to human capital measurements,
especially in the education and health
sectors.
3.2.2  Measurement
We can once again refer to an indicator
used by the United Nations in identifying
Least Developed Countries (LDCs); the
Human Asset Index (HAI). This is made
up of four elements, each with the same
weight: two indicators relating to health
(the child mortality rate and the percenta-
ge of the population suffering from malnu-
trition) and two indicators for education
(the adult literacy rate and the secondary
school enrolment rate) (United Nations
2008, Guillaumont 2009b) HAI is prefer-
red to the better known Human
Development Index because its content is
more comprehensive, including a nutrition
factor, and uses more reliable data (for
12
(8)  Namely Angola, Chad, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, and par-
ticularly Sudan.example child mortality rate, in place of
life expectancy). Moreover, the Human
Development Index components include
per capita income, which is already inclu-
ded in the allocation formula. 
3.2.3  Simulations 
We have expanded previous simulations
by incorporating the EVI and HAI alloca-
tion formulas simultaneously (Amendment
3, Annex A). The results are reported in
simulation 3 in Annex C. As the most vul-
nerable countries often have often a low
level of human capital, these results in
which the governance weighting is scaled
down to 0.33 instead of 0.5 generally
increase allocations to Fragile States,
except for Togo.
3.3  Population Weight
3.3.1  Justification
The EVI takes small population size into
account; but with a weighting of only 25
percent. As a result, the inclusion of the
EVI in the formula does not make it pos-
sible to maintain Ethiopia’s allocation
below the 10 percent threshold of avai-
lable ADF resources. However, this result
is just barely achieved where the popula-
tion factor is raised to exponent 0.8 rather
than 1 as in the second simulation (simu-
lation 2bis); the allocation is slightly above
10 percent for the other simulations (bet-
ween 11 and 12 percent).
3.3.2  Simulations
These new simulations show that small
countries are significantly favored, to the
detriment of the more highly populated
ones. Comparing simulations 2 and 2bis,
it may be seen that the disadvantaged
countries are those with populations of
over 24 million, and especially when their
populations are increasing. The sacrifices
imposed on highly populated countries
are more evenly distributed. Ethiopia
would receive UA 431 million and
Tanzania UA 267 million, keeping the
order of the allocations deriving from the
formula calculation which, as we have
seen, is not the case for the current distri-
bution, owing to the ceiling. Regarding the
least populated countries, Sao-Tom￩ and
Principe (160,000 inhabitants) receives
UA a supplement of 2 million, Cape Verde
(530,000 inhabitants), UA 9 million, and
Djibouti (830,000 inhabitants), UA 5 mil-
lion. Aside from Sao-Tome, whose alloca-
tion goes from 5 to 7 million it may be
noted that, using a population exponent of
less than 1 (for instance 0.8), it would be
possible to do without the basic allocation
(UA 5 million)(9), According to the results
of simulation 3bis, Ethiopia continues to
13
(9) The new simulations (coded bis in the table) take into account the basic allocation of UA 5 million.exceed the ceiling while Sao-Tome and
Principe obtains only 5 million; but it will
of course, be possible to choose a lower
exponent to give smaller countries a little
more of an advantage. 
4.  ADF Support to Regional
Integration
Most multilateral development finance ins-
titutions are concerned about promoting
regional integration among developing
countries. For the AfDB, this concern is
particularly marked, given the small
demographic and economic size of most
African countries. It is a source of satis-
faction that the proportion of resources
allocated to regional operations is higher
than in other institutions(10) and has been
rising. 
An ADF-11 innovation is that one-third of
the cost of regional operations will be
deducted from allocations to the countries
concerned (except for regional goods).
The regional allocation financing two-
thirds of the regional project is thus inten-
ded as an incentive to encourage coun-
tries to finance integrating projects. The
deduction from the national allocation is
capped at 10 percent, when that alloca-
tion is below UA 20 million. This provision
affects nine of the forty countries. 
This is the source of a certain discontinui-
ty in the incentives to encourage involve-
ment in regional operations. Take the
case of a country whose allocation
increases from UA 19 to 21 million (about
the size of Guinea’s allocation) and which
wishes to participate in a regional integra-
tion project for an imputed value for it of
UA 36 million. If its allocation had remai-
ned at UA 19 million, it would have to
contribute UA 1.9 million from its country
allocation to the regional project and it
would have UA 17.1 million left to finance
its national projects. However, with its
allocation up to UA 21 million, it will finan-
ce from its allocation a third of UA 36 mil-
lion, that is, UA 12 million, and have only
UA 9 million left instead of UA 17.1 mil-
lion. 
Moreover, imputing to each country a spe-
cific share of the financing of a regional
project (which will determine the amount
of its national contribution) is not function
of the expected economic benefit (indeed
often difficult to assess), but rather of the
share of the cost of the project actually
implemented in its territory. For a road
project, that share will depend on the dis-
tance over its territory. In reality, a coastal
country – which has less interest in a road
than a landlocked country that would be
opened up by such a project – could be
14
(10) This proportion is 4.6 percent for IDA and 7.2 percent for IDA allocations to African countries compared to
15 percent for ADF 10 (IDA 2007c)forced to make the larger contribution to
the construction. A concrete example is
the road linking Mombasa (Kenya) and
Kampala (Uganda). In sum, the impact of
the regional reserve on ADF country aid
allocation is difficult to measure. 
Two questions emerge:
i.   To what extent should countries contri-
bute to regional projects out of their
country allocations? The current alloca-
tion system treats this aspect explicitly,
rightly favoring small countries that 
have greater need for regional integra-
tion, but bringing about discontinuity in
the treatment of countries according to
their size. We propose that the share
of regional projects financed out of
national allocations decrease in line
with the countries’ need for regional
integration, so as to avoid anomalies
with regard to the amounts of national
contributions. 
ii.  How should the allocation which is ear
marked for regional operations be dis-
tributed among the countries? Cur-
rently there is a practical approach to
allocating funds in light of regional 
investment opportunities. We suggest
that a supplementary potential country
allocation be introduced for the sole
purpose of financing regional opera-
tions, and awarded in accordance with
each country’s relative need for regio-
nal integration. This provision should
be a strong incentive for mounting inte-
gration projects(11). 
5.  Conclusion
A critical examination of the geographical
distribution of ADF funds reveals the
excessive weight given to sound econo-
mic policy and good governance and the
lack of transparency and consistency of
the allocation formula. Good governance
is a subjective notion that varies over
time. It contributes to the instability of allo-
cations which, though calculated for a
three-year period, are readjusted every
year. The analytic basis of this weighting
of good governance is debatable since it
is not the only, not even the main, factor
determining aid effectiveness. Moreover,
since the importance attached to good
governance led to little aid being given to
countries emerging from war or crisis,
while they are particularly in need of
assistance, this key allocation principle
has been undermined by the Fragile
States Facility. As a result countries with
Country Performance Assessments
around the mid-point of possible scores
receive abnormally high amounts of aid.
Lastly, the introduction of thresholds and
ceilings at the different stages of calcula-
15
(11) See the more detailed  report available from the AfDB Development Research Departmenttion of allocations complicates the appli-
cation of the formula and has brought
about discontinuity and unfortunate thre-
shold effects. 
The proposed amendments of the existing
allocation formula are justified in light of
the three guiding principles: aid effective-
ness, equitable aid distribution, and trans-
parency of the formula. The first proposal,
the most desirable in our view, would be
to include an economic vulnerability crite-
rion in the formula; a second would be to
simultaneously introduce a human capital
criterion; and a third, to reduce the weigh-
ting of the population element. Our nume-
rical simulations show that this amend-
ment would make it possible to forego the
Fragile States Facility as well as the coun-
try allocation ceilings, and thus avoid the
resulting inconsistencies. 
The mechanism would continue to be
supplemented with a specific regional
integration allocation. In that regard this
report proposes two amendments. Firstly,
the share of regional projects financed
from the national allocation could be
decreased in accordance with a country’s
need for regional integration, therefore
avoiding anomalies in the countries’ requi-
red contributions. The second amendment
seeks to set a country potential allocation
supplement specifically for financing
regional operations, again depending on
the relative need for regional integration,
which itself increases with a country’s
exposure to external shocks. This amend-
ment would thus provide an added incen-
tive for promoting regional projects.
Seeking to reduce the weight of sound
economic policy and governance in the
performance-based allocation formula
does not mean that the quality of econo-
mic policy is of no significance for deve-
lopment aid policy. The idea is that policy
quality should determine aid modalities
rather than be a criterion for selection of
countries to be assisted, so as to avoid
doubly penalizing inhabitants of the worst
governed countries, which are also very
largely to be found in the Fragile States
category. The key issue is then not so
much whom to assist in order to be effec-
tive, but rather how to assist. In that
regard, the quality of governance and
economic policy could determine both aid
beneficiaries (central government or other
actors) and conditions attached to aid.
Thus, poor governance could result in dis-
tributing aid through the local communi-
ties, civil society organizations – where
these exist- or enterprises; it should also
lead to a preference for project aid over
budget support and greater weight to
technical assistance. Good governance
should allow for budgetary aid modalities
that are more respectful of the sovereign-
ty of countries desiring to own, and which
can own, their economic policies. 
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Washington, 2008.Annex A: Amendments to the
Allocation Formula
A.1.1  Base Allocation 
The Performance- Based Allocation
(PBA) formula is as follows:
with CPA as the Country Performance
Assessment, GNI is Gross National
Income, and P for population. GNI is
expressed in United States Dollars and is
the average for the 3 years preceding the
year of calculation of the allocations. The
population data is provided by the United
Nations and covers the year preceding
the year of calculation of the allocations.
The CPA is itself the weighted sum of
three indicators:
with             as the sum of structural
and social macroeconomic policy indica-
tors,  the            indicator of public sector
and institution management, CPPR
(Country Portfolio Performance Rating) the
proportion of the country’s projects that
were classified at evaluation as problem
projects converted on a scale of 1.5 to 5. A
base allocation of UA 5 million is distribu-
ted to all ADF-eligible countries and the
allocation is capped at 10 percent of the
total allocation at each stage of calculation.
The first stage in calculating allocations
using the formula is followed by a second
stage that takes into account the grant/
loan distribution and relatively reduces the
grant allocation. A third stage deducts
from the allocation, the AfDB debt cancel-
lations under the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative. 
A.1.2. Benchmark Allocation
The sum of the base allocation deriving
from the previously defined 3 stages of
calculation and fragile states top-up is
used for purposes of comparison. This is
the allocation which considered appropria-
te, since the aim of introducing the EVI is
to integrate all the countries. Those recei-
ving the top-up are: Burundi, Central
African Republic, Comoros, C￴te d’Ivoire,
the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Togo. In addition, C￴te d’Ivoire benefits
from the second pillar for arrears clearan-
ce (103 million). As the beneficiaries of
the left-over 51 million from the 408 mil-
lion set aside for fragile states were unk-





(2)A.1.3  Amendments to the formula




The simulations have been carried out by
adding the total Fragile States provision to
the total funds allocated in accordance
with the PBA.
As EVI is calculated on a scale of 0 to
100, it has been brought to the same
scale as the CPA by dividing by 20 and
adding one unit. The human asset provi-
sion has been reversed, i.e., 100 – HAI,
and then put on a scale of 1 to 6. This
transformation enables the allocation to
be highest where the human capital level
is lowest. In addition, a base allocation of
UA 5 million continues to be provided to
all member countries, though no ceiling is
applied in this case. The 3 simulations are
also repeated giving a population expo-
nent of 0.8.
Annex B: Alternative Governance
Measures
The Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi (KKM)
index has six dimensions: “voice and
accountability, political stability and absen-
ce of violence, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law and control
of corruption”. While taking into account
several CPIA elements through the mea-
suring of government effectiveness and
regulatory quality measures, this index
gives greater weight to the quality of politi-
cal governance (accountability, stability,
rule of law and control of corruption).
Doing Business provides a quantitative
measurement of legal and regulatory
conditions (entailing time frames and
costs) whereby a local small or medium-
sized firm can conduct its business, in
other words, start up its activity, obtain a
building permit, employ workers, register
its ownership rights, obtain credit and pro-
tect its investment, pay taxes, import or
export goods, secure its contracts and
conclude its activity.
The Mo Ibrahim index comprises five cri-
teria: “Safety and security, the rule of law,
transparency and corruption, Participation




Note :The current allocations could be slightly different from those for 2008, owing to the redistribution of funds
that some countries lost as a result of the application of ceilings, the granting of loans and the cancellation of
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Annex D: 2008 ADF Allocations per Capita according to CPA Level per Quintile24
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